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Abstract
The global village in which we live enables increased trade and commerce across regions
but also brings a complicated new set of challenges such as terrorist activity, human and
drug smuggling and theft in foreign or domestic locations.
Containers travel the globe, across all seven continents. In the wake of intensified
security concerns since the September 11, 2001 attacks, tracking containers and their
contents presents an increasing concern for those institutions and personnel charged with
ensuring their security.
This thesis analyzes the risks associated with global container transport. The concept of
an e-container is set forth as a risk mitigation technology that uses real-time monitoring
of a container's physical status acquired from an array of embedded RFID-enabled
sensors. A framework is suggested that relates sensor-identified signatures and
phenomena to behaviors representing breaches in container security. A theoretical model
suggests which sensors are required to identify the individual breaches in order to
mitigate container security risk.
Thesis Supervisor: David L. Brock
Title: Principal Research Scientist, MIT Auto-ID Lab
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Section 1 Introduction
This thesis studies the risk involved in global container shipping and how this risk
can be mitigated through real-time monitoring of a container's physical status acquired
from an array of RFID-enabled sensors. The e-container is introduced as an integrated
solution.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has created the Container
Security Initiative (CSI). This consists of four central components:
1. Establishing security criteria to identify high-risk containers
2. Pre-screening containers before they arrive at U.S. ports
3. Using technology to pre-screen high-risk containers
4. Developing and using smart and secure containers
(CBP4, 2002)
The main goal of the CSI is to secure the U.S. and global economy from a
container security perspective. The research in this paper is in line with the CSI four
components.
1.1 Research Problems and Motivation
Merchandise, supplies, commodities, cargo, and freight, collectively referred to as
goods, are at the core of global trade. Most of these goods, estimated to be about 90% of
worldwide cargo, are transported by containers. In fact, more than 16 million containers
annually arrive in the United States (U.S.). More than half of these containers arrive via
ocean cargo ships. Consider that a majority of these containers are large enough to hold
multiple nuclear warheads, many tons of Anthrax, and other mass-destruction devices.
(CBPl, n.d.) "Clearly, a terrorist attack on a major U.S. port could bring this trade to a
grinding halt" (CBPl, n.d.). Just the threat of weapons of mass destruction or other
chemical and/or biological weapons making their way to the U.S. poses phenomenal
challenges for global supply chains.
The global village in which we live enables increased trade and commerce across
regions but also brings a complicated new set of challenges such as terrorist activity,
human and drug smuggling, and theft in foreign or domestic locations.
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Containers travel the globe, across all seven continents. In the wake intensified
security concerns since the September 11, 2001 attacks, tracking these containers and
their contents presents a major problem for those institutions and personnel charged with
ensuring their security. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Commissioner
Robert C. Bonner said: "Because of the nature of potential concealment [of weapons] in a
container, they are the potential Trojan horse of the 21 St century" (Keane, 2004).
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is handing out multi-million
dollar grants to security and technology related companies to develop tracking
technology; however, for the average size supplier, most of the commercially viable
technology is exorbitantly expensive. The adoption of the technology depends greatly on
the ability to afford the technology, and if the implementation makes economic sense. In
addition, new rules and regulations are increasing inspection times, waiting time, border
hold-ups, and are presenting many new interruptions in the supply chain and flow of
goods between countries. New partnership agreements such as the Customs Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) will allow certified shippers to pass though
inspections quickly and reduce their waiting times. See Appendix 3 for a more through
explanation.
The U.S. government, in its attempt to stop terrorism at the source, is placing
customs officials in foreign ports to check and seal containers before they head toward
North America. This could mean changes to international treaties such as the NAFTA1.
To address the aforementioned challenges and security concerns, this research
paper will recommend a Real-Time Container Tracking System that secures every
container transiting ports of entry as well as domestically (The risks are identified in
Section 2). This system is designed to mitigate the major risks associated with container
shipping. The system uses RFID-enabled active tags and sensors to monitor and
'North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA): a comprehensive trade
agreement linking Canada, the United States, and Mexico in a free trade area. It called
for the gradual elimination of duties and trade tariffs between the member countries.
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communicate container status. The scope of the paper is to identify the risks associated
with container transport, and demonstrate which sensors would be useful for mitigating
each risk.
1.2 Methodology
This paper is comprised of four parts. Firstly, it will examine the risks involved
in the transportation of containers. Second, it will describe a variety of sensors and
describe how active RFID works. It will then describe the signatures and phenomena the
threats introduce and will conclude with the introduction of a system that provides real-
time tracking of shipping container vital signs (temperature, humidity, ambient light, etc.)
using active RFID and discuss how this system will increase container security and
visibility throughout the supply chain.
By surveying current literature the field of container security, RFID and sensors,
and interviewing industry experts, I extrapolated a list of the major risks in container
shipping security and identified which sensors might help mitigate each risk.
1.3 Literature Review
This section will discuss trends, government activity with regard to corporate
partnerships, RFID and counterterrorism as well as outlining the major stakeholders in a
global supply chain.
1.3.1 Early Adopters
The recent major North American investment in RFID technology was
spearheaded by Wal-Mart's mandate which "...instructed its 100 largest suppliers that
they are required to attach RFID tags on pallets and cases of goods delivered to the
world's largest retailer's warehouses serving its Dallas stores. An additional 26 suppliers
have asked to participate in the program" (Delaney, 2004).
Directives from the United States (U.S.) Department of Defense (DoD) and
Federal Drug Administration to implement RFID in select areas of their supply chains
came shortly after.
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"The U.S. DoD is in the midst of implementing RFID and working to replace its
13 core logistics systems, which include several thousand applications, with a version of
SAP AG's software2 tailored for defense operations" (Songini, 2004).
1.3.2 Partnerships
Boeing and Airbus, which together own the market for large commercial jets, are
working together to promote the adoption of industry standard solutions for RFID on
commercial airplane parts. "By the end of the year, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) is expected to certify the use of these passive RFID tags for parts that will be used
on planes" (Roberti, n.d.).
RFID implementation has created some interesting partnerships among major
world business players. It is the inability to agree on industry standards that is creating
major delays on RFID implementation.
1.3.3 Trends
Growth of Cities
The number of cities in the world is on the rise. The greater the number of cities,
the more transportation is required for trade and supply of food, etc. The United States
for example has been seeing almost exponential growth in this area over the past 50
years. As the number of cities grows, so does the need to transport goods to these cities.
This places stress on logistics systems and increases the need for greater container
security. Figure 1 depicts this growth.
Number of U.S. Cities (1954-2004)
30000 -
24,978
25000 -
20000 -
215000 . 13509
10000 - 7397
5000 - 2,392
49 64 100 120 318 532 666
1954 1971 1975 1977 1980 1987 1987 1987 1994 1998 2001 2004
Year
Figure 1. The increase in the number of cities results in a commensurate demand in
transportation and logistics investment. Source of original data: (Goentzel, 2004)
2 SAP is an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software. ERP software can aid in the control of many
business activities, like sales, delivery, billing, production, inventory management, and human resources
management (Wikipedia.org). Integration with this type of software is discussed further in Section 5.
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Spending
Logistics spending is on the rise. U.S. logistics costs increased by $26 Billion
from 2003 to 2004. (Beadle, 2004) In fact, China's total logistics spending was estimated
at about $500 billion in 2003, with a compound annual growth rate of 8%. This year's
estimate exceeds $600 billion. (The Edge Singapore, 2005) Mick Barr, associate director
of global physical distribution at Procter and Gamble, says his company spends more
than $3 billion a year on logistics services. Almost all of this money is spent on outside
logistics service providers, ranging from large integrators to traditional warehouse and
transportation firms, as well as 3PLs with niches or geographic specialties. (Bank, 2004)
Speed
Shippers, retailers and customers are demanding shorter lead times and quick
delivery of goods. Next-day delivery is a very common offering.
"In 1994, Global Trade and Transportation Magazine stated that regardless of
mode, 40% of shippers in the U.S. expedited cargo market said on-time performance was
most important. The marketplace will be more information-intensive in order to meet
shippers' core requirements" (Chandler, 1994).
Standards
Harmonization is the name given to the effort by industry to replace the variety of
product standards and other regulatory policies adopted by nations in favor of uniform
global standards. (Public Citizen, n.d.) There are many standards for RFID readers, and
tags, globally. The challenge of standardization also conflicts with government spectrum
regulation. Developing a unit that can transmit on legal spectrum in all countries may be
difficult. "EPCglobal is leading the development of industry-driven standards for the
Electronic Product Code to support the use of Radio Frequency Identification." 3
Exporting Customs Officials and the WCO
On December 9, 2004, the World Customs Organization (WCO) for the first time
ever endorsed a Framework of Standards to secure and facilitate global trade that is based
7
3 Source: http://www.epcglobalinc.org/
upon principles designed and implemented by the U.S. CBP. The most essential parts of
this endorsement involve:
. The 24 hour rule - CBP must obtain advanced electronic information on all
cargo shipped to the United Stated 24 hours before it is loaded onto a
container.
. Advanced targeting system - used to identify high risk containers
* Container Security Initiative - CBP officers are stationed abroad to screen
high-risk containers before they are loaded onboard vessels destined for the
United States.
* C-TPAT - as discussed in Appendix 3
(CBP3, 2004)
The CSI will also place CBP officials in foreign ports for pre-screening and
inspections prior to shipment to the United States. This will allow more high-risk
containers to be identified and examined than U.S. ports can currently handle.
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1.3.4 Stakeholders
The stakeholders in the supply chain play a vital role in information sharing,
security guarantees, and most importantly, the allocation of investment funds.
The following is a list of stakeholders in a fairly typical supply chain for a
company that imports cargo from China to the United States. It is the model that will be
used throughout this paper in order to maintain consistency. As supply chain security
becomes more comprehensive, this list will undoubtedly grow.
Manufacturer
Issuers of Letters of Credit
Insurance Underwriters
Shenzhen Customs
Hong Kong Customs
Hong Kong Harbor
3PLs
Value Added Manufacturers
Harbormaster HK
Port Facility Manager HK
Shipping Company
Pirates
Terrorists
Smugglers
US Coast Guard
16. Homeland Security
17. US Customs
18. C-TPAT officers
19. HazMat Officers
20. Immigration
21. Long Beach Harbor
22. Harbormaster US
23. Port Facility Manager US
24. 3PLs US
25. Value Added Manufacturers US
26. TL & LTL Carriers
27. Rail Carriers
28. Distribution Centers
29. Wholesaler
30. Retailer
(Locher, 2005)
All stakeholders have some common concerns:
- Security of the contents
- Have the contents been tampered with, damaged, stolen?
. Payment schedule
* On-time delivery
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
1.3.5 Related Background information on Government and
Regulations
Governments play a significant role in a global economy. The implications of
their regulations, policies, and laws have a strategic value which can significantly impact
business and trade operating on a global basis.
Trade Agreements and Organizations
Security is taking center stage in the majority of trade agreements since the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist bombings. Furthermore, trade agreements
increase globalization and increase foreign relations and trade.
North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
"The North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may take on new
members. Bennett Marsh, deputy executive director for trade policy, Caribbean Latin
American Action, predicts significant NAFTA growth within 3 years. He expects
CARICOM or the Association of Caribbean States to be among new NAFTA members"
(Selwitz, 1994).
World Trade Organization (WTO)
The World Trade Organization (WTO) 4, in its attempt to create a safe and "rules-
based" trade agreement between the 148 member countries (as of October 2004) has
some fragmented mentions of security; mostly with regard to food and perishability.
"Measures with minimal impact on trade can be used freely - they are in a
"green box". They include government services such as research, disease control,
infrastructure and food security" (Understanding the WTO, n.d.).
4 The World Trade Organization (WTO): the only global international organization
dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements,
negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world's trading nations and ratified in their
parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers
conduct their business. (WTO.org, n.d.)
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Other Important Agreements with the United States
- Permanent Normal Trading Relations with China (PNTR)
- The U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was signed on June 6, 2003
- The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was signed by President Bush on
May 6, 2003 and currently awaits Congressional approval.
1.3.6 Technology
Customs organizations presently employ multiple technologies for scanning and
determining the contents of containers:
X-Ray Machines:
The Canadian Border Services Agency utilizes a Pallet Vehicle and Cargo
Inspection System known as VACIS. The government has purchased three machines
thus far for $2 Million CDN each. The VACIS "is a self-contained stationary gamma-ray
scanning system that captures images of pallets and large pieces of freight in customs
commercial examination facilities" (Canadian Border Services Agency, 2005). The
system is used to aid border officials in examining densely packed freight without having
to open containers. It can detect contraband, weapons, and other potentially dangerous
goods.
A low-level radiation source penetrates cargo and allows operators to view
radiographic images of goods and find hidden areas where unidentified goods may be
stored illegally. If the cargo is different than that which was declared in the manifest,
inspectors will take action.
Global Position System:
A global position system (GPS) can be used to track the physical location of a
container and transmit this information in real-time to a central system. Use of the GPS
for tracking of vehicles, aircraft, and containers is common.
E-Seal:
The present technology for securely monitoring containers is a vast improvement
over a simple seal and x-ray machine, however it is still insufficient. Firstly, the present
systems (called e-seals) do not offer a wide-enough variety of sensors, nor do they
communicate vital information in real-time to a data processing subsystem.
II
The tag collects real-time information, and stores it to memory. When an
operator is ready to collect the information, a handheld device is pointed at the e-seal and
the data collected by the seal is downloaded to the device. The seals come in the form of
a sensor bolt, or "smart seal" that is attached to the outer door of a container.
Figure 2. A GE worker reads an e-seal attached to the outer door of a container.
Source: http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleview/1 317/1/1 /
The latter also monitors if tampering has occurred with the lock. When the
container arrives at a port, the information from the e-seal is downloaded to a central
system and the sensor metrics can be traced back to individual time stamps.
"To date the error rates have been so high that it is just not a useful device," said
Christopher Koch, president of the World Shipping Council and newly appointed liner
carrier representative on the Coast Guard's National Maritime Security Advisory
Committee and CBP's Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations. (Kulisch, 2005)
The two largest e-seal manufacturers are GE and SAVI Technology. SAVI uses
an active RFID tag in the seal while GE's system is based on a proprietary radio protocol
and does not follow the RFID standards. This means that presently, the e-seal cannot
keep an inventory count of RFID tagged items within the container. (Kulisch, 2005)
The e-seal option has undergone scrutiny since it is very conspicuous. Thieves
are aware that if the e-seal used, the cargo is valuable enough to warrant the expense of
the seal. This makes the container more of a target. In addition, the actual container door
12
. .. ........... .. .... .
can be removed by its hinges without being detected, and the e-seal will not detect a
breach from the sides, roof, or floor of the container.
The U.S. CBP is presently promoting a "Smart Box" technology that will give
containers "green lane" clearance under the C-TPAT program. The C-TPAT awards: no
inspection upon arrival to the United States (except for random inspections), and
immediate release to low-risk shippers. The technology that is presently being promoted
detects and records whether tampering has occurred to the container seal after it has been
affixed at the point of origin.
The problems with this technology are exhibited in the following examples:
I. A terrorist with connections at a port in the Middle East, smuggles a weapon into
a container before it has been sealed. The container is sealed, and sent to the
United States. Upon arrival in the port of Long Beach, the information about the
tag is downloaded. The seal has not been altered or tampered with, and therefore
it is cleared through customs and the container is put onto a truck and allowed to
pass freely into the United States.
2. A container is sealed in China and put onto a ship destined for America. While at
sea, the ship is boarded, and a weapon or drugs is inserted into a container. The
"Smart Box" collects information on the date and time the container security was
breached. Upon arrival at the port of Los Angeles, the container is transported
onto the dock and the tag information is downloaded. The customs official
notices that the security of the container was breached, and proceeds to inspect the
container - unsure for what exactly he was looking. When the nuclear weapon
was inserted into the container, so was a GPS. During the few hours it takes for
customs officials to finally inspect the container, the terrorist knew that the
container had reached its destination and remotely exploded the bomb.
The preceding two examples call for sensors that can detect nuclear radiation, and
transmit the readings in real-time to customs. If the container had this sort of system, the
weapon would have never reached North America, and the container could potentially
5have been removed by helicopter or simply thrown overboard for later diffusion at sea.
The proposed system is discussed in Section 5
5 Corrective action is out of scope for this thesis but is discussed further in Section 6
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Section 2 Containers and their Risks
In the 1930's, Malcolm McLean conceived the idea of using large steel containers
as a common method to transport goods by truck and maritime vessel. He thought of the
idea while waiting for cargo that he had transported to the port of New Jersey by truck to
be unloaded and then re-loaded onto a ship for maritime transport. (CBP4, 2002)
2.1 Containers
This section will provide a background on the different types of containers and
their uses. It will then cover how containers are loaded and unloaded. This information
is essential to understanding how sensors may affect the physical container and how
containers move around a port, dock or yard.
2.1.1 Container Types
The primary function of a container is to hold and protect its contents for
transportation purposes. Containers are transported either by rail, truck or ship; however,
commonly containers are transported using a combination of all three modes
(intermodal).
There are 4 basic styles of closed containers 6 that are used for transportation purposes
(containers for other purposes will be discussed later in this section).
The dry freight container is used primarily for any type of good that is
not affected by most weather conditions. This type of container will be
used for transporting goods ranging from clothing, to other packages,
automobiles, etc.
Insulated containers are used for transporting goods that are more
weather sensitive such as electronics, and foods that do not require
refrigeration.
Refrigerated containers are used for transporting goods that must remain
as specific temperature and humidity levels. Examples are frozen
goods, perishable foods, and medicine.
6 Source of container and chassis pictures: http://www.isocontainers.com
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Open top containers are used in situations where the goods require very
little protection from the elements. The best example is hauling dirt, tree
branches, or even garbage.
There is a great surplus of containers in North America due to the fact that the
U.S. has a merchandise trade deficit and has been outsourcing a great deal to foreign
countries - most specifically China. (WTO.org, n.d.)
Some companies have been finding novel ways to use containers. For example,
Disney stacked a wall of containers to use for the world premiere screening of the movie
"Pocahontas." 7 They are also used as shelters, storage facilities and workshops.
2.1.2 Container Design
This paper will focus specifically on containers that can are sealable and can be
transported using the three major modes - rail, truck, ship. Intermodal containers are
designed in such a way that they can accommodate many different types of lifts and
jacks. Figure 3 depicts the typical design of an intermodal container.
Easy op e ing Venti Sysem All ste Stncual
Flo
Figure 3. The design of a container is important when considering hardware
integration. Diagram Source: http://www.dropboxinc.com/containers/index.htm
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2.1.3 Transporting Containers
Containers are transported either by rail, truck or ship. A common occurrence is a
combination of all three.
When transported by truck, the containers are loaded onto trailer
chassis. The chassis are pulled by trucks.
When transported by rail, the containers are loaded onto an empty rail
car. If overhead bridges in the area can accommodate it, containers
can be stacked two high (double stacked).8
Containers travel on ships stacked many stories high.9
It is important to note that containers are loaded and
unloaded onto rail cars, ships or trucks
individually' 0
8 Picture taken at Intransit Rail Yards, December 2004
9 Photo Source: http://www.containerinfo.net/le%20container.htm
10 Picture taken at Intransit Rail Yards, December 2004, Picture taken at Port of Barcelona, January 2005
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2.2 Container Security
2.2.1 Security on the Container
Currently, the U.S. Government-approved security tags are small seals that are
attached by hand to the container. If a container seal is compromised, the container is
inspected upon arrival to a U.S. port. Containers are generally treated fairly roughly by
large machinery, and seals are often damaged accidentally. This causes unnecessary
inspection.
Container seals are very small rubber and/or metal locks
and/or bolts that are attached to the clasp of containers. Recently,
stronger mechanical locks and bolts have been introduced to the
market.
It should be noted that containers seals are removed at
different border crossings and resealed. The seal found on a container
at its final destination is unlikely to be the initial seal used when the
container was loaded if it passed through customs in more that 1
country.
" Picture taken at Intransit Rail Yards, December 2004
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2.2.2 Inspecting a container
Containers that arrive in ports are usually scanned for hazardous items by x-rays
or gamma rays that penetrate the steel containers. Depending on the results, a container
will either be loaded on to a ship or proceed to a more invasive examination which
involves opening the container and searching through the goods. In 2002, the Australian
government planned to "spend $190 million installing massive high technology x-ray
machines which can detect anything from bombs to guns to drugs and can scan up to 100
shipping containers a day" (Epstein, 2002).
Containers are commonly loaded by hand or machine and items are stacked to fill
as much volume as possible. Utilizing the maximum volume in a container is referred to
as "cubing out."
Shipcases... to Mixed PaIlets... to Trucks
Figure 4. Cases, pallets and containers are loaded according to software
algorithms to maximize volume and weight. The configuration of containers
must be considered when inspecting a container.
Diagram Source: http://www.topseng.com/MaxLoadFeatures.html
Containers can be loaded with multiple types of goods, and be partially
refrigerated. There are many vendors that sell software specifically for load planning
optimization. Figure 4 depicts an "optimally loaded" box, pallet and container.
This is important to note when attempting to conceptualize the effort and time it
takes to completely search a container. It is also an area for potential system integration
with customs organizations in order to facilitate inspection.
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2.3 Risks Associated with Containers and Container Shipping
The world's heavy reliance on shipping containers, coupled
with their vulnerability, means that a terrorist attack using
containers is not only possible but would also have high
economic costs. The obvious problem is that it's hard to
know what is inside the millions of sealed containers. They
could be used to transport weapons or other destructive
material. They could also be used as weapons on their own.
(OSCE.org, n.d.)
The U.S. Customs and Border Patrol can "rule out 94% of the cargo as potential
threats prior to arrival" in a U.S. port of entry (CBP5, 2004). This also means that only
6% of the cargo entering the country is actually inspected. Those containers that have
been ruled out may have been safe at the time they left the area where they were sealed,
but on their journey to America, there are numerous events that may have occurred.
Some of the major risks associated with shipping a container, whether it is by truck, rail
or ship are as follows:
0
0
0
0
0
Stowaways & Human Smuggling
Weapons Smuggling
Nuclear Materials Smuggling
Drug Smuggling
Injection of Chemical and Biological Agents into the container
Theft of Containers and their Contents (Piracy)
Explosion or Leakage of Dangerous Materials
Risk of Damage to Goods During Inspection
Size of Maritime Vessels
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2.3.1 Stowaways & Human Smuggling
In 2001, the U.S. border patrol apprehended 1.2 million people that tried to enter
the country illegally. Since 1994, the Border Patrol has made 11.4 million apprehensions
nation-wide.' 2 Figure 5 demonstrates the living conditions within a container used to
transport people from China to the United States.
Figure 5. Human smuggling often involves people living in a sealed container
for many days and often weeks with no source of water or food, or pluming.
Photo Source: http://msnbc.com/news/354340.asp?cpl=1
"According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the U.S. State
Department, 700,000 to 2 million people, the majority of them women and children, are
trafficked each year across international borders. Thirty-five percent are under the age of
18 ... According to CRS, trafficking in people represents the third-largest source of
profits for organized crime after drugs and guns, generating billions of dollars each year"
(Orhant, 2002).
"In June 2000, in Dover, Great Britain, customs officials found 58 Chinese
migrants dead. The 54 men and 4 women were asphyxiated in the airtight refrigerated
trailer of a truck passing into England" (Interpol, 2005).
2.3.2 Weapons Smuggling
Weapons smuggling is a very profitable, global business that is of increasing
concern as the threats of terrorism have increased over the last decade. In 1991, James
Guerin, was indicted for laundering $700 million in weapons and cash over an 11-year
period. According to testimony, Mr. Guerin and his team smuggled more than "$30
1 http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/factsheets/
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million of military-related equipment to South Africa in violation of U.S. laws and a
United Nations embargo. The material included missile parts, components for night
vision goggles, and optical equipment... Some of the items involved ultimately were
shipped to Iraq, which used them in artillery shells fired at U.S. troops during the Persian
Gulf war." (Pasztor, 1991)
2.3.3 Injection of Chemical and Biological Agents into the container
Chemical warfare agents are among the easiest weapons of mass destruction to
produce. "The toxicity of chemical agents falls generally between that of the more deadly
biological agents and that of conventional weapons" (CIA, 1996).
* Choke Agents
* Blood Agents
* Blister Agents
- G-Series Nerve Agents
. V-Series Nerve Agents
All of these materials can be easily injected into a container while it is sitting at a
truck-stop or on a train that has stopped for refueling, or on a ship that has been boarded
in the middle of the night.
Biological warfare agents are just as easily injected into a container, their most
effective use would be in a container carrying food.
. Bacteria
. Rickettsiae
. Viruses
* Fungi
. Toxins
All of these materials can be injected or piped through small holes into a container
carrying food and the agents can eventually spread to farmland, livestock, grocery stores,
pet food stores, etc.
2.3.4 Nuclear Materials
In August 1994, approximately 130 barrels of enriched uranium waste from a
storage facility in South Africa was stolen. The location of the contents is still unknown.
(CIA, 1996) A standard container can carry many of these barrels at a time. A container
is large enough to easily accommodate multiple nuclear warheads.
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The greatest threat in these cases is with the following scenario: a manufacturer
that is classified as "low threat" for the U.S. CBP ships a container to the United States.
The container is intercepted at sea during the night or on land while at a truck stop and
the contents are switch from clothing to a barrel of enriched uranium, or a nuclear
warhead. The container is then resealed and sent on its way without anyone knowing. If
the container is not inspected, the contents will most likely make it through to their
original destination.
2.3.5 Drug Smuggling
Drug smuggling generates approximately $20 billion yearly in revenues (mostly
from cocaine and heroin) to its collaborators. The supply chain essentially has 3 major
locations: source country, transshipment country(s), and destination country. The bulk of
the drugs are produced in third world countries where governments have weaker security
infrastructure and tend to be more corrupt. It is then transshipped to slightly richer
nations where it is sorted and shipped to wealthier countries as a final destination.
Premiums are paid at each step in the chain since the risk increases closer to the
destination. Approximately 40% of all cocaine shipped is seized along the way. (Reuter,
2002)
What is important to note here is that the drug supply chain has several price
markups that are domestic to a country. Once imported, drugs will pass through a chain
of dealers and distributors who each take a percentage of the profits.
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The United Nations International Drug Control Program estimates the
international drug trade at $500 billion in 1997. Some of the expenditures are captured in
Figure 6 below:
Estimated Illicit-Drug Expenditures by Nation
Dependent Users Per Capita Drug $ perNation '000s Income (ca. Expenditures in Dependent
1994) $Billion User
Italy 170-420 $18,160 7-13 33,898
Sweden 17 $17,900 0.4 23,529
USA 2,700 $24,680 48.7 18,037
Australia 100-300 $18,530 2.0-4.4 16,000
Thailand 1,300 $6,350 1.1-1.9 1,154
Pakistan 3,000 $2,160 1.5 500
Figure 6. It is important to notice that illicit drug use is rampant
throughout the supply chain, and monitoring is important from
source to final destination. Source Data: (United Nations, 1997a)
A small number of nations account for the vast bulk of production of coca and
opium. According to official estimates (e.g. U.S. Department of State, 1999), Myanmar
and Afghanistan account for 90 percent of global opium production (3,100 tons out of
3,462 tons); Bolivia, Colombia and Peru account for all of coca production. (Reuter,
2002)
Heroin is usually found concealed in an array of different payloads; frozen fruit
pulp containers, wooden furniture and sometimes even suspended in liquids.
2.3.6 Theft of Containers and their Contents (Piracy)
Container theft is a very serious and growing problem worldwide. As
international trade and shipping proliferates and grows, so does the risk and instance of
container theft. The risk further increases if the goods have a black market value. These
goods include computers, entertainment equipment, name brand clothing and footwear,
perfume, jewelry, cigarettes and prescription drugs. (Atkinson, 2001) "Worldwide, the
direct cost of cargo theft [in 1991] is estimated at about $30 billion USD per year, with
indirect costs many times higher" (Mayhew, 2001). The indirect costs stemming from
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investigation and insurance payments can cost upwards of two to fivefold the direct
losses - in the realm of $20-$60 billion USD. (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1980)
Cost Breakdown by Percentage
Transportation Method % of Total $30 Billion Estimate
Road Transport (Truck) 87% $26.1 Billion
Maritime Cargo (Container Ship) 8% $2.4 Billion
Rail Cargo 4% $1.2 Billion
Air Cargo 1% $300 Million
Figure 7. The majority of logistics costs are in the road transportation
segment. Source data: (DeGeneste & Sullivan, 1994)
Trucks are inconspicuous, easily identifiable and often left unattended at truck
stops, loading docks, and motels.
Maritime theft often occurs in ports (very often through organized crime), at sea
when large container ships are boarded by pirates, and on offshore platforms. The goods
are thrown overboard into smaller vessels.
2.3.7 Explosion or Leakage of Dangerous Materials
Refrigeration on ships provides the shipping industry with the ability to transport
items over long distances that would normally expire through perishability.
Refrigerated containers (reefers) are more commonly cooled using the readily
available ammonia. Freon was the standard until its negative environmental effects were
discovered. The greatest benefit of a reefer is that the contents (usually food products) do
not require unloading into a refrigerated cargo hold. This aids in the prevention of
pilfering, loss and spoilage. The major issue with refrigeration is that it can create a
combustible atmosphere, and in the event of fire, it will create higher concentrations of
carbon monoxide.
Nitrogen is generated on refrigerated ships in order to cool a refrigerated cargo
hold. Permeate, is the product of the generation process of Nitrogen and is a strong
oxidizing agent and accelerates chemical reactions such as corrosion. It is also
combustible. (Guldner, n.d.)
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The issues in this section essentially create a situation where a container
containing dangerous chemicals or a machine that can generate sparks is the equivalent of
a bomb.
2.3.8 Risk of Damage, Loss or Theft During Inspection
When containers are inspected, the risk of damage to goods purely from handling
or mishandling increases. When the contents of containers are removed and spread over
the floor of a warehouse for inspection, the risk of loss or theft also increases. It is in the
interest of customs, the manufacturer, the retailer, and insurance companies to reduce the
number of unnecessary container inspections.
2.3.9 Size of Maritime Vessels
The final and most evident risk with regard to container shipping is at sea.
Container ports and canals are being expanded in order to accommodate the ever-
increasing size of new ships. If one container explodes, all other containers and the ship
can sink and/or explode out at sea, or in a port. The larger the ship, the more fuel it can,
and usually does carry on board.
China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company ordered four 10,000 Twenty-Foot-
Equivalent (TEU)" container vessels. The next generation of vessels are expected to
have capacities upwards of 18,000 TEU; enough to hold 22 to 24 containers across a 60-
meter-wide deck and drafts of 15 to 21 meters. (Fry, 2005)
13 Twenty-Foot Equivalent (TEU): a unit that expresses the relative number of
containers based on the equivalent length of a 20' container. For example, 100 containers
of 20' is 100 TEUs, while 100 containers of 40' is 200 TEUs. Source:
http://www.export911 .com/e9 11/ship/conShip.htm
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Section 3 Sensors and RFID Telemetry
In 2002, the U.S. government enacted the United States Container Security
Initiative (CSI). The goal of this initiative is to use information technology (IT) to
identify, track, and target high-risk shipments for inspection. The existing port
infrastructure cannot meet CSI requirements and hence there is a need for new and
innovative ways of leveraging cutting-edge technology to cost-effectively meet the
requirements. Government and industry are partnering to introduce "smart" containers
that employ RFID tags to monitor containers. This collaboration is an extension of the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). It is referred to as the C-
TPAT Plus. In fact, 32 ports in the North America are CSI compliant and are
experimenting with RFID-enabled containers and about 20 countries have also adopted
CSI (CBPl, 2004).
3.1 RFID - Active and Passive
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) "is essentially the contemporary barcode"
(Howe, 2004). It is a technology that allows businesses to automate the collection of
supply chain information, thereby creating error-free fulfillment, delivery and visibility.
Some of the advantages of RFID over barcodes are:
* No line of sight requirement
. A sealed tag can function in multiple weather conditions
. Long readability range
. Multiple tags can be read/written simultaneously
* Tracking is in real-time
. Tags can hold small amounts of data
. Weather resistant
* Most importantly, RFID tags provide a UNIQUE identification of an item
All RFID systems (Active and Passive) involve 3 main components:
1. Transponder: The RFID tag is affixed to and stores information about a specific
object.
2. Transceiver: The RFID reader must be located within a certain distance from the
tag and can read and write information to and from the tag.
3. Data Processing Subsystem: The systems that use the data collected from the
RFID tag.
A chart defining the RFID class structure can be found in Appendix 2.
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3.1.1 RFID Passive Tags
Passive tags do not have any self-contained power sources. They are powered
remotely by the reader. The tags are comprised of a single chip and an antenna. Power is
emitted from readers in proximity to the tag and the tag responds by command. Each tag
contains an unalterable unique identification number which makes passive tags useful in
item tracking and security. Passive RFID is frequently used with security badges in high
security areas such as airports. These systems track the location, entrance, and exit of
personnel through restricted and sensitive areas.
The Chinese government is evaluating the insertion of passive RFID tags into
passports. The American government is experimenting with placing RFID tags in the
passports of visitors to the USA. (Chabrow, 2005)
3.1.2 RFID Active Tags
Active tags have a power source (usually a battery) that powers a transmitter on
the tag. They work more efficiently than passive tags in electro magnetically noisy
environments. Comparing to the passive tag, the active tag has longer read ranges, larger
data storage capacity, and greater programmability. When Active RFID is combined
with sensors, active tags can send information to a reader automatically.
Advantages of Active over Passive RFID:
. Longer read range
- Passive tags range is usually a few feet while active tags have ranges
up to 85 meters
. Larger data storage capacity
- Passive tags can hold very limited amount of information while
active tags can store and save larger quantities
. Data can be sent at pre-programmed times
- Passive tags are only activated when in the read range of a reader
while active tags can activate themselves at pre-defined intervals
and send information
The first practical application of active RFID systems was developed and used
during World War II. There was a need to remotely identify allied planes to prevent
friendly fire. This lead to the development of the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)
system. "This embodied all the basic features of RFID: an interrogatory radio signal was
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picked up by the object to be identified, which then automatically replied by transmitting
an identifying code" (Goodwins, 2005).
Another of the RFID success stories is EasyPass which allows vehicles to pass
through toll booths without stopping. The tag is read and a system automatically debits a
customer's account. 4
When Active RFID is combined with sensors, active tags can send sensor
information to a reader automatically. An example would be identifying unscheduled
movements of inventory.
3.2 Sensors and What They can Presently Detect
Telemetry sensory can be connected to active RFID tags and used to monitor and
detect different metrics that are useful to the supply chain stakeholders (Section 1.3.4) in
order to mitigate risk. The sensors are actually used to measure changes in their
respective metric such as temperature increase or humidity decrease. The currently
available sensors can measure numerous parameters within the containers and will be
discussed below:
1. Ambient Temperature
2. Light
3. Humidity
4. Pressure
5. Vibration
6. Sound
7. Acceleration
8. Existence
9. Current Draw
10. Motion
11. Air Exchange
12. Explosives
13. Location
14. Radioactivity
15. Weapons Existence
16. Chemical
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14 http://www.eazypass.ie/?sec=faq
A Note Regarding Sensors
Sensor telemetry provides information in analog format. In order for a computer
to provide an analysis on the data, it must be converted into a digital format using an
Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC). "However, the way in which we capture
environmental data digitally entails practical issues related conversion, resolution, error,
delay, and power consumption" (Emery, 2005).15 The bits are then sampled at predefined
intervals to detect changes and patterns since the general idea is to transmit only
deviations from a pre-existing state.
1. Ambient Temperature
The ambient temperature in a container will be measured in Fahrenheit, Celsius or
Kelvin.
Figure 8. Temperature sensors can give fast and accurate readings with water resistance
and physical robustness. Source: http://www.thermometrics.com/htmldocs/jdrel.htm
2. Light
Light sensors exist that are sensitive enough to detect existence and intensity as well as a
broad wavelength light sources
Figure 9. Light sensors can detect existence and intensity of light. Source:
http://www.globalspec.com/FeaturedProducts/Detail?ExhibitID=8690&deframe=I
3. Humidity
Humidity sensors detect moisture levels in the atmosphere
Figure 10. This sensor can detect 10,922 humidity and 10,922 temperature measurements
simultaneously in real-time. Source: http://www.omega.com/ppt/pptsc-right.asp?ref-OM-
CP-MICRORHTEMP&Nav-temhu02&subsection=Hu02&book=Temperature&des-pptsc
" For information on practical issues related to conversion, please refer to (Emery, 2005)
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4. Air Pressure
Air pressure sensors can detect present and changes in air pressure (measured in Pascals)
to help control ventilation.
5. Vibration
Vibration sensors can detect small-scale linear velocity, spatial displacement and
acceleration. This detects movement of the object being monitored.
6. Sound
Sensors can measure sound in frequency and decibels. They can detect changes in sound
levels that range from sonic to ultrasonic
7. Acceleration
Sensors are able to detect movement of the container in any direction as well as the
acceleration.
8. RFID tag Existence
A small RFID reader can be used to take an inventory of the RFID Passive tagged objects
within the container.
Figure 11. This RFID reader is small enough to plug into any standard CF slot or PCMCIA
slot with an adapter. Source: http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/3 9 3/l/l/
9. Current Draw: on the Tag
The Active RFID tag in the container will require
placed on the tag to monitor current draw.
10. Motion
A motion sensor can be used to record movement
monitoring. A current sensor can be
inside the container.
Figure 12. This Motion Sensor can monitor human movements to measure body segment
orientations (3D angles) and kinematic data (such as 3D accelerations) wirelessly with low-
weight/low-power requirements. Source: http://www.xsens.com/index.php?mainmenu=
applications&submenu-human motion&subsubmenu=biomechanics
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11. Air Exchange
Air exchange sensors can be used to determine air quality - carbon monoxide, carbon
dioxide, formaldehyde, volatile organic compounds, etc.
12. Explosives
An explosives sensor can be used to detect any form of explosives the may enter the
container.
13. Global Position
A Global Positioning System (GPS) can be used to monitor the container's physical
location at all times.
14. Radioactivity
A radioactivity sensor can be used to determine existence and levels or radioactive
materials inside the container.
15. Weapons Existence
Ultrasound sensors in early stages of development can scan an object or human and
create an ultrasound image of the concealed object.
Figure 13. Ultrasound machines in development can create an ultrasound image
of a concealed weapon. Source: http://www.jaycor.com/jaycor-main/web-
content/emesensultra.html
16. Chemicals
"Researchers at the Georgia Institute of Technology have developed a chip-based
machine that can detect illegal drugs similar to how a police dog does. The Dog on a
Chip can recognize as little as one-trillionth of a gram of cocaine from as far away as a
drug-sniffing dog could detect it. The research team is enhancing its device to detect
additional drugs, chemical agents, bombs, and other harmful substances such as anthrax"
(Paulsen, 2004).
Figure 14. Chips can detect cocaine vapor and potentially other illicit drugs and
Anthrax. Source: http://www.computer.org/computer/homepage/050 4 /briefs
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Section 4 Threats and Phenomena
Signatures observed by sensors can be interpreted as representing certain threats.
Threats will be observed from different perspectives depending on the sensor. For
example, human cargo will picked-up in a motion sensor as a moving object. In a
humidity sensor, a human presence will be represented by an increase in humidity due to
breathing and in a CO 2 sensor by a steady increase in CO 2 levels in the atmosphere.
More than 90 per cent of global freight nowadays is shipped
in containers. According to the World Shipping Council,
there were almost 11 million maritime containers in
circulation in mid-2003, most of which were not properly
secured. Containers can be easily tampered with throughout
the stages of their journey and used for terrorist or other
criminal activities. (OSCE.org, n.d.)
In section 3, the available sensors were discussed. This section demonstrates how
phenomena exhibited by sensors may be interpreted as behavior within the container.
Figure 15 maps sensor data to behaviors.
A key assumption used in the creation of the following models is that the sensors
will be functioning in a sealed, air-tight container, and will perform their function
flawlessly. The sensors can function similarly in a non-air-tight container; however the
results must be interpreted differently. Also, it assumes that sensing begins when the
container is originally sealed. For instance, weapons smuggling can be exhibited in
sensors as a container breach if inserted after the first sealing. This model assumes that
the weapons were inserted at the start. If inserted later, the e-container will show signs of
a container breach, and show the existence of weapons as well once inserted.
The second model in Figure 16, demonstrates the correlations made between
phenomena and sensor identified risks.
The core findings of the modeling done in this thesis are illustrated when the
sensor identified phenomena is interpreted as a manifestation of the risks identified in
Section 2.3. Figure 17 demonstrates the correlations between sensor activities and the
risks of container transport.
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Phenomena vs. Sensor Model
Phenomena Sensors May
Detect
DIJMAMrAk
K-
Figure 15. The phenomena sensors may detect is matched with each sensor or set of sensors
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Phenomena Correlated to Identified Risks
Phenomena Correlated to
Phenomena Correlated to
Identified Risks
PHENOMENON
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Figure 16. The phenomena sensors can detect is correlated to the Identified Risks from Section 2. It should be noted that in
most cases, redundancy using combinations of sensors will obtain the desired result.
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Sensors vs. Identified Risks
Figure 17. Model of Sensors vs. Identified Risks
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4.1 Analysis of Findings
Figure 15 demonstrates the combinations of sensors that are required in order to
identify the phenomena exhibited by sensors. There is sensor overlap. When some risks
are mitigated using a set of sensors, others will be covered as well. Ports, shippers,
governments and the CBP must decide which risks are more likely to occur, and must
determine areas of investment.
It is obvious from the findings that the e-container is most effective at discovering
an incident of tampering with a sealed container. It is more difficult to determine the
safety of container contents. This means that it is relatively easier to detect if someone
has broken into a container to insert something than it is to monitor the original items that
were put into a container before it was sealed. The reason for this is that it is fairly
simple to detect a container breach.
Explosions, Stowaways and Human Smuggling, and Container Theft are three
risks that are easier to monitor since they can be observed using a multitude of different
sensors. There are many behaviors and phenomena that can be used to interpret a
container break-in, theft, or movement in the container. If items are tagged with RFID
passive tags, maintaining an inventory of the items inside the container will inform
shippers of items that have been removed and not replaced (during a customs inspection,
items should be removed and replaced exactly how they were found).
Weapons smuggling is difficult to monitor. There are sensors in development that
can scan for weapons, however there are no perfect scanning methods as of yet. It
appears from the model that if we consider the situation where a container is sealed and
later opened (breached) for weapon insertion, the e-container can treat weapons
smuggling as a container breach, and once a breach has occurred, the container will be
inspected.
There are some risks that can be discovered only using sensor designed
specifically for identifying a specific phenomena. For example, nuclear materials can be
discovered only using sensors designed to detect radioactivity and drug smuggling, can
be detected only with chemical sensors calibrated for that purpose.
Monitoring the theft of items from a container equipped with an RFID reader will
become increasingly easier as more objects are tagged with passive RFID chips.
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Monitoring the goods manifest of a container while it is being inspected will save time,
loss, and pilferage from the inspection process. In addition, monitoring the theft of an
entire container is best done using a GPS and noting movement where it is unexpected.
Ambient Temperature, Humidity, Light, Air Pressure, Sound and Motion are the
types of sensors that cover the greatest number of instances of sensor identified
phenomena while Humidity, Air Pressure, and Air Exchange are the three most versatile
sensors, as they span 4 different risk areas. Acceleration, Current Draw, GPS,
Radioactivity and Weapons Existence on the other hand, are only useful for observing a
single characteristic per sensor.
Finally, the most effective combination of sensors to use in order to mitigate all
the identified risks is: RFID Existence, Air Exchange, Radioactivity, Chemicals, and
Weapons Existence. Current draw can be used to detect tampering with the tag.
4.2 When a container must be inspected further
The U.S. CBP has invested in large x-ray machines to scan containers. These
machines can x-ray a container and find 5 metal barrels for example, but they cannot
determine the barrel's contents. Presently, if the CBP is interested in investigating these
barrels further, they are required to open the container. Potentially, with further
investment in the x-ray machines, or RFID sensors on containers, the CBP will be able to
identify the contents of the barrels.
In section 2.3.9, a risk that was identified is that of the growing size of maritime
vessels. If all containers were RFID enabled with the proposed system, a risk mitigation
measure could be that the system monitoring all the containers would be able to identify
containers that should be placed or stored separately from other containers. An example
of this situation would be a container filled with magnets should be stored far from a
container full of computer hard drives. Similarly, a container containing cow hides
should be stored far from a container loaded with vegetables.
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4.3 Customs issues with the technology
Customs often performs random container inspections. However, in order to keep
the shippers from determining a pattern, and as part of their practice, they do not want the
shippers to know when they perform inspections. It is important for customs to be able to
reset the RFID tags and be certain that nobody will be able to know they searched a
container.
There is another reason they need to be able to perform this action. I learned from
interviewing a Canada Customs agent (who wishes to remain nameless), that if a
container is inspected and drugs or contraband items are found, they will put everything
back into the container and act as if nothing was found. The container will be monitored
closely by camera and microphone in order to catch the criminals in the act and this
footage is used as evidence in court.
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Section 5 The e-Container - Mitigating the Risk
When the data from sensors is combined with active RFID, the ability to track the
security and vital sign of a container emerges.
What this thesis proposes is a system that combines active RFID with a set of
sensors (sensor choice model discussed in Section 4) located inside the container with the
RFID antenna being the only part of the system on the exterior of the container. On the
exterior, the antenna would be protected, and have its own specific sensor that would
detect tampering.
Antenna
Figure 18. There are many areas on a container where an antenna could
easily be inserted and protected.
The reader and tag would communicate more frequently than the present e-seal.
However, the advantage of the e-container is that it does not only communicate the tag's
unique identification number through RFID, it also communicates the sensor data in real-
time.
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5.1 Overall System Architecture
The system (Figure 19) gives an end-to-end visibility of the container shipment in
real-time. A container can be tracked by satellite when sailing on the sea, by Wi-Fi / Wi-
Max network when in the port proximity, or by cellular network when traveling on land.
The container has a seamless transition from various readers with no interruption of
service.
Middleware
Cellular Wi-Fi/Wi-Max Satellite
Receiver Receiver Receiver
Module Module Module
Cellular
Network
I
(A) (B) (C)
Figure 19. Proposed Overall System Architecture
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5.2 The Components
The proposed system consists of the active tag, a reader and a centralized data
center. Each component is described below at a high level:
5.2.1 The Active RFID Tag
The active tag is packaged into a rigid mechanical enclosure to ensure its
operation in all environmental conditions.
- Sensor I/F 1
Sensor I/F 2
Demodulator -. Decoder -
Antenna MCU
ModulatOr - ncde .
Power -___nsr____
Control EEPR M
Figure 20. The Active RFID Tag - Explained below
The proposed active tags have the same components as conventional passive tags.
However, to interface with the sensor interfaces (I/F) and to provide limited intelligence
on the active tag, a miniature micro-controller is installed as part of the active tag. The
Multi Controller Unit (MCU) collects sensor information from its various sensor
interfaces and proceeds to either transmit directly to the reader through an antenna or
store data temporarily on the EEPROM memory. Active tags are powered by batteries;
the present e-seal battery guarantees are 10 years on average. These batteries would have
a similar lifespan. The active tags are designed to be installed inside the containers while
antennas are designed to be installed outside the container. The reason why antennas are
installed outside the container is to overcome signal attenuation due to the metallic walls
of the container. Presently, the e-seals are installed on the exterior of the container and as
mentioned above, are prone to tampering.
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Container
Security Device
Figure 21. The e-Seal is affixed to the exterior of a container is and prone to tampering.
Photo Source: http://www.geindustrial.com/ge-interlogix/docs/2004-2838_Sell.pdf
5.2.2 Active Tag Reader
The Active tag reader will be installed in different transportation modes such as
container ships and trucks. Depending on the transportation mode, readers will be
equipped with different communication mechanisms:
A) Cellular Functionality
Figure 22. Trucks would be fitted with RFID readers and The signals would be transmitted to
the central data center via Cellular technology. Photo Source: http://www.the-truckers-
page.com/behrendt.jpg
Each container truck has an active tag reader, which continuously collects the
sensor data. The active tag reader communicates to the centralized data center through
cellular network, such as GSM, GPRS, EDGE or CDMA network.
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B) Wi-Fi/Wi-Max Functionality
Figure 23. RFID readers would be scattered throughout a port and on cranes in order to
have a constant flow of information with total coverage. The signals would be
transmitted to the central data center via Wi-Fi/Wi-Max technology. Photo Source:
http://128.121.48.70/images/guides/hongkong/travel/customsl.jpg
The active tag reader will be deployed on top of the container crane within the
container port as well. It communicates with the centralized data center through either
Wi-Fi or Wi-Max.
C) Satellite Functionality
The container ship would share several common active tag readers and have an
on-board Wi-Fi or Wi-Max network similar to that of the port. The will readers
constantly read the responses from the active tags and in turn communicate with the on-
ship communication system that will use global satellite services such as Inmarsat or
GlobalStar to communicate with the centralized data center.
Figure 24. Satellite Communication is
available at open sea. Photo Source:
http://www.nas aexplores.com/show_912
_teacher st.php?id=030509132457
Figure 25. RFID readers would be scattered
throughout the ships in order to have a constant flow
of information with total coverage. The signals
would be transmitted to the central data center via
satellite technology. Photo Source: http://www.cont
ainerinfo.net/le%20container.htm
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5.2.3 Centralized Data Center
The next logical question with regard to data collection is "what do you do with
the data once it is collected by a reader?" and "How does the system work?"
Data Acquisition Unit
Satellite
Receiver
Module
Cellular RFID
Receiver Middleware
Module
WMS
Wi-Fi/Wi-Max
Receiver
Module
Figure 26. The Centralized Data Center interprets the collected outputs from the Active
RFID tags and communicates with various applications and other systems
Centralized data center has a data acquisition unit, which collects outputs from all
readers collecting data from active tags that are transmitting real-time information from
sensors. RFID middleware will filter and aggregate the relevant information and feed the
relevant information to various applications such as ERP, WMS or proprietary
government security agency systems. It is important to note the bi-directional arrow
between the middleware and the Data Acquisition Unit. With bi-directional
communication between the Middleware and the sensors, system operators (the
stakeholders) can request more detailed sensor information at will.
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5.3 Data Transmissions
There are four types of data transmissions the container would use:
1. Heart Beat: Scheduled, used for synchronization - the container's active tag
sends a small 1 or 2 bit message to the central system to confirm that all systems
16are functioning correctly and there has been no tempering
2. Threshold Break: Unscheduled, event driven - if any of the sensors detect
readings outside of the acceptable range, or if the container's sensors "think" that
someone is tampering with the tag or any sensor, a tampering message would be
sent to the central system. The message would include a date and time stamp,
GPS location and unique identification number of container along with the
affected sensor. (See Section 5.3.1)
3. Scheduled Scan: Scheduled to a regular programmed interval, the active tag in
the container will send a full diagnostic with all collected sensor data to a reader.
This information will then be sent to the central system for analysis.
4. Manual Scan: At any point, the active tag can be read on-demand by a
designated reader.
5.3.1 Sensor thresholds
Sensors would have thresholds or ranges by which they would be monitoring and
judging the container's contents. An example is humidity. The owner of the container
may suggest that a humidity level of 25% with a standard deviation of 2% is normal. If
the humidity in the container exceeds this range, there is a problem. An example
problem could be that someone is breathing inside the container.
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16 Should be based on ISO standards
5.4 Other uses for the e-Container
The secondary consequence of this comprehensive security system for containers
will be a real-time perishability manifest for customers. An example is a grocery chain
importing fish, meat or other perishable goods. If one assumes a five day trip, and the
container's monitoring system notices that oranges froze on day two, the company would
know in advance and could order another shipment. This would allow the grocery chain
to potentially lower safety stock levels since some variability could potentially be
removed from the system.
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Section 6 Conclusion and Future Research
6.1 Conclusion
This thesis analyzed the risks associated with global container transportation. The
phenomena exhibited by each of the identified risks involved in global container shipping
can be detected, identified, and monitored using an e-container. The e-container concept
was set forth as a risk mitigation technology that uses real-time monitoring of a
container's physical status acquired from an array of embedded RFID-enabled sensors.
This integrated solution is used to capture metrics, and communicate this information to a
centralized data center.
By modeling the correlations between sensor-identified phenomena and the risks,
this thesis established the optimal selection of sensors to use in order to detect and
monitor each risk. As long as one can identify risk occurrence, one can act upon it.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert C. Bonner called
containers "the potential Trojan horse of the 21s' century" (Keane, 2004). With the
correct systems and sensors in place to identify and detect phenomena associated with
risk, the 6 steel walls of a container become slightly more transparent.
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6.2 Future Research
The next logical step in this research is to investigate how the Active Radio
Frequency Identification tags, combined with a hybrid of mobile technologies which
increase security and visibility throughout the supply chain will subsequently increase the
velocity of cross-border shipments, and increase awareness of perishability level breaches
- translating this information into cost savings.
It is my hypothesis (for future research) that if a container is tracked and its
contents are monitored using the correct metrics, given the security levels of the system,
the overall cost of international transportation will decrease; despite the cost of the
system. The eventual cost savings will occur as a consequence of the following reasons:
- Reduced risk of inspection
- Shorter waiting times at the border
- Reduced border hold-ups
- Perishability Notices
Important questions that need to be answered:
1. Who determines sensor thresholds?
a. Will it be the World Customs Organization?
b. Will it be local governments?
c. Will there be a world standard set?
2. If a threat is detected, what actions are to be taken?
a. In a port
b. On a ship
3. What are the repercussions and associated costs of a false alarm for each risk and
who pays the bill?
4. What are the associated costs and ROI's?
5. How can you determine if a container is empty?
6. How will custody (of container) transfer points work?
7. What is the container lifecycle?
a. How will the system be integrated into the container?
b. When in the manufacturing cycle?
8. How will the RFID system be integrated into existing legacy, ERP and CRM
systems.
9. How can this system help with:
a. Yard dock visibility
b. Scheduling
c. Logistics management
d. Visibility
i. Customs
ii. Suppliers
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iii. Manufacturers
e. Reverse logistics
10. How will the e-container system be regulated?
11. What will be the role of the:
a. DOD
b. DHS
c. CBP
12. What will be the effects on:
a. CSI - Track all containers
b. C-TPAT - Green Lane
c. C-TPAT Plus - Green Lane
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Section 7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix I - Interesting Border Patrol Facts for 2004
Source: http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4257
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
2004 Year End Review
The following is a snapshot of 2004 accomplishments and statistics for the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Customs and Border Protection (CBP):
* 428 million passengers and pedestrians, including 262 million aliens, were processed at
land, air, and sea ports of entry. Of that number over 643,000 aliens were deemed
inadmissible under U.S. law.
* 1,158,800 illegal aliens were arrested by Border Patrol agents between our official ports
of entry.
* The Container Security Initiative (CSI) was expanded to include 21 countries. CSI is now
operational in 33 foreign ports in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The port of Dubai recently
became the first Middle Eastern port to participate in CSI.
* Three months ahead of schedule, the Integrated Automated Fingerprint System (IAFIS) is
now operational at all Border Patrol stations. From September through November, over
23,000 individuals with criminal records have been identified and arrested. 84 of those
detained were murder suspects and 151 were wanted for sexual assault.
0 The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terror (C-TPAT) has become the largest
government/private partnership to arise from September 11th. Just over 8,000 private
sector members have applied to participate in C-TPAT.
* CBP officers and agents made 56,321 seizures of illegal drugs, with a total weight of
2,199,619 pounds. Of this number, CBP officers at official ports of entry made 47,744
seizures nationwide, weighing 844,222 pounds and worth an estimated $1 billion. CBP
Border Patrol agents made 8,577 seizures, totaling 1,355,397 pounds of illegal drugs
worth an estimated $1.62 billion between the official ports of entry.
0 Together with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), CBP seized more than $138
million worth of counterfeit goods in FY 2004, up from $94 million worth of counterfeit
goods in FY 2003.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA):
* FEMA provided $2.25 billion in aid for individuals and families affected by disasters. The
outlay included $1.29 billion in housing assistance, $918 million for other needs
assistance, such as medical expenses and personal property losses, and $30.98 million
in unemployment benefits.
* More than 1.1 million hurricane victims have registered for assistance since mid-August,
the highest ever. $1.43 billion has been spent for individual assistance needs and $1.15
billion in public assistance for the state and local governments.
* 15,560 federal workers were engaged in response and recovery operations for the
declared disasters of 2004, including more than 11,000 FEMA personnel and 1,900
disaster medical specialists. As part of the massive response effort in Florida and other
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hard hit states this past fall, 163 million pounds of ice, 10.8 million gallons of water, 14
million meals-ready-to-eat and 151,000 rolls of plastic roofing material were delivered to
help meet immediate emergency needs.
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC):
* Provided basic and advance law enforcement training to more than 44,750 students,
representing 81 federal agencies, as well as state, local and international law
enforcement organizations.
* Aggressively pursued new initiatives in support of homeland security; developing counter-
terrorism training programs and facilities; enhancing intelligence awareness and analysis
training offerings; and incorporating sophisticated technologies, such as computer
generated or controlled simulations, into training.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE):
ICE was the second-largest federal contributor to the nation's Joint Terrorism Task Forces
(JTTFs) with more than 300 ICE agents assigned to JTTFs nationwide.
* More than 2,500 criminal investigations were conducted involving the illegal export of
U.S. arms and strategic technology, including Weapons of Mass Destruction.
" ICE made 1,368 arrests and brought 895 indictments for money laundering and other
financial crimes, exceeding arrests and indictments of the prior fiscal year. ICE seized
more than $202 million worth of currency, bank accounts, properties and vehicles as a
result of financial investigations.
* More than 4,600 child sex predators were apprehended nationwide and over 2,100 child
sex predators were deported. The first child sex tourism arrests were made under the
Protect Act.
* A 112 percent increase over the prior year for fugitive apprehensions resulted in more
than 7,200 arrests. More than 150,000 aliens were removed in FY 2004, 53 percent of
who were criminals. This is an all-time record.
* Federal Protective Officers were responsible for 4,426 arrests - a 58 percent increase
over the previous fiscal year. They responded to 430 bomb threats and 877 calls about
suspicious packages and other items at federal facilities.
Transportation Security Administration (TSA):
Passenger screening has been effective in 2004 by keeping 6,501,193 prohibited items from
coming on board aircrafts. The following is a partial list of prohibited items found during screening
in 2004:
** 1,895,915 Knives
** 3,285,994 Other Cutting Instruments
** 294,694 Clubs
** 20,509 Box Cutters
** 598 Firearms
** 693,548 Incendiaries
* Over 3,000 arrests were made at security checkpoints.
* Approximately 650 million passengers traveled by air in 2004. 1.8 million Passengers
traveled per day and experienced an average screening peak wait time under 12 minutes
and an average wait time of 3 minutes in 2004.
* Approximately 600 million checked bags were screened using advanced explosive
technologies in 2004.
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United States Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS):
* 500,000 new United States citizens were naturalized.
* 9,000 active duty military personnel were naturalized through expedited processing.
35 million background checks of persons petitioning for immigration benefits were
conducted.
* More than 20,000 children from around the world were adopted by U.S. families due to
petitions processed by USCIS.
* Almost 50 million visitors sought information about immigration benefits and procedures
from the USCIS web-site.
United States Coast Guard (USCG):
0 255,233 pounds of cocaine were seized breaking the record set in 1997.
* 10,348 migrants were interdicted.
* 5,498 lives were saved and 30,895 search-and-rescue cases were conducted.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) was implemented. It is the largest
maritime regulatory project in our nation's history, which entailed the establishment of 43
Area Maritime Security Committees as well as the creation of 43 Area Maritime Security
Plans, almost 9,200 Vessel Security Plans, and over 3,100 Facility Security Plans.
United States Secret Service (USSS):
* 30 individuals involved in global cyber organized crime, domestically and internationally,
were arrested through Operation Firewall. Industry experts estimate that $1 billion in total
fraud loss was prevented.
0 Completed 13,395 criminal investigations and arrested 5,566 individuals. Of these, 1,956
individuals were arrested for manufacturing or possessing counterfeit U.S. currency,
which resulted in the seizure of 499 counterfeit production plants and $46.5 million in
counterfeit currency.
* The Secret Service Electronic Crimes Task Force Initiative was expanded to include 15
task forces that work with federal, state and local law enforcement agencies across the
country, prosecutors and experts from the private sector and academia.
US-VISIT:
In January 2004, US-VISIT (was successfully implemented at all 115 U.S. international airports
and 14 seaports. Since that time, more than 370 people with records of criminal or immigration
violations have been prevents from entering the U.S. by Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Officers.
On September 30, Visa Waiver Program (VWP) travelers were included in US-VISIT and the
program has now processed more than 14 million travelers while not increasing wait times and
earning praise for its privacy efforts.
US-VISIT is now operational at the nation's 50 busiest land border crossings where significant
time savings are already occurring.
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7.2 Appendix 2 - RFID Class Structure
Class V
Class V tags are essentially readers. They can power other Class I, II and
II tags, as well as communicate with other Class IV tags and with each
other wirelessly.
Class IV
Class IV tags are active tags. They may be capable of broadband
peer-to-peer communication with other active tag in the same
frequency band, and with readers.
Class III
Class III tags are semi-passive RFID tags. They may support
broadband communication.
Class II
Class II tags are passive tags with additional
functionality like memory or encryption.
Class I/Class 0
Class 0/Class I tags are read-only passive identity
tags.
Source: http://www.autoidlabs.org/researcharchive
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7.3 Appendix 3 - C-TPA T
In order to increase safety and security along the U.S. - Canadian border, the two
governments have created the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program - "...a common
approach to risk management, partnering with those in the trade community who have a
history of compliance and are committed to the integrity of their supply chain
management processes, using compatible and advanced technology..." (DHS, 2002)
Since the September 11 attacks, the Customs and Border Patrol's (CBP) number
one priority is to combat the threat of terrorism. As a sub-section of the FAST program,
the CBP created the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) as a means
for the trade community to collaborate with the CBP to ameliorate the security of
international supply chains that flow through the United States. The C-TPAT is a
certification that is awarded to companies which enables customs clearance more quickly
and at a lower total cost. These are benefits that only the CBP can provide. The C-TPAT
is a major federal initiative designed to make international shipping efficient and secure.
The following are the benefits the CBP provides though C-TPAT certification:
" A reduced number of inspections and reduced border wait times.
- A C-TPAT supply chain specialist to serve as the CBP liaison for validations,
security issues, procedural updates, communication and training.
- Access to the C-TPAT members through the Status Verification Inter face.
* Self-policing and self-monitoring of security activities.
- In the Automated Commercial System (ACS), C-TPAT certified importers
receive reduced selection rate for Compliance Measurement Examinations (-3X in
FY 2003) and exclusion from certain trade-related local and national criteria.
- C-TPAT certified importers receive targeting benefits (-7X in FY 2003) by
receiving a "credit" via the CBP targeting system.
- Certified C-TPAT importers are eligible for access to the FAST lanes on the
Canadian and Mexican borders.
- Certified C-TPAT importers are eligible for the Office of Strategic Trade's
(OST) Importer Self-Assessment Program (ISA) and have been given priority
access to participate in the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE).
- C-TPAT certified highway carriers, on the Canadian and Mexican borders,
benefit from their access to the expedited cargo processing at designated FAST
lanes. These carriers are eligible to receive more favorable mitigation relief from
monetary penalties.
- C-TPAT certified Mexican manufacturers benefit from their access to the
expedited cargo processing at the designated FAST lanes.
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- All certified C-TPAT companies are eligible to attend CBP sponsored C-TPAT
supply chain security training seminars. (CBP 1, 2004)
The C-TPAT certifications are industry specific. For example, there are different
certifications for Importers, Air Carriers, Foreign Manufacturers and Air Freight
Consolidators (CBP2, n.d.). Interestingly, the C-TPAT is not required, and application is
entirely voluntary. Initially, the program will give companies a competitive edge by
granting quicker, hassle-free movement of goods across the border as well as formal
security training and other advantages. However, as a greater number of companies are
awarded the certification, the C-TPAT will in all probability become an industry
standard, and companies that do not apply, or are denied a C-TPAT, will be at a
competitive disadvantage.
One of the greatest benefits of the C-TPAT is that with a faster and more reliable
flow of goods through the border, companies can better forecast inventory needs and
lower safety stock levels. If the program functions properly, one of the potential benefits
of the C-TPAT is that companies will have a higher percentage of on-time deliveries.
This will allow them to lower safety stock, and should help companies get closer to just-
in-time levels of inventory. This having been discussed, the CBP has been slow to react
to criticism about the program not meeting expectations.
A major problem companies are facing regarding C-TPAT certification is the
cost. The largest costs are not in terms of filling forms or paying for inspections, they are
the internal costs and investments in security and consulting. Firms often have to change
legacy Information Technology (IT) systems so they can be capable of collecting
additional information (NAFTA Certificate of Origin, HS Codes, copies of shipping
documents, etc.), change processes, train employees on new processes, and hire
consultants to actually define and design the processes.
As the C-TPAT rules evolve, many of the initial all-voluntary guidelines have
become regulation. This demonstrates a shift in strategy. Obviously, as the C-TPAT
voluntary rules increasingly become regulation, the C-TPAT essentially becomes
mandatory. Either way, voluntary or not, companies will have to subscribe to the C-
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TPAT rules in order to be competitive or follow regulation - thus, it is in a company's
best interest to become C-TPAT compliant and apply for certification as quickly as
possible. There have been arguments amongst the National Industrial Transportation
League (NIT) and the CPB regarding the present certification rules due to the fact that
businesses are not experiencing the promised benefits from their multi-million dollar
investments in the program. NIT League Executive Vice President Peter Gatti wrote: "It
would also lead many existing participants to re-evaluate whether to continue with the C-
TPAT program based on the costs and liability risks associated with the proposal as
compared to the benefits derived from C-TPAT" (Keane, 2004).
Some of the major complaints industry has put forth are that shipments are not
moving any quicker through the border, nor are they receiving the variety of training that
was promised. The information regarding shipment information has also been
incomplete or missing.
The C-TPAT program, once the CBP pulls out of this early stage of development,
in essence, should be a win-win for the import industry players and the CBP. However,
notwithstanding the fact that the program is in its early stages of implementation, the
CBP must still work out some of the aforementioned issues if it is to win the support it
requires for the program to be considered successful.
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